Who has the balls?, page-15

In answer to your question, thefollowing may be helpful:

 

Short positions end of trade 28November, 2018: 12.4million

Short positions end of trade:  17 December, 2018: 15.44million

24% increase in short positions (ie.3million extra short positions) during the period 28 November, 2018 to 17December, 2018

Volume of trade 29 November, 2918 to 17December, 2018: 9.44million

Short selling as % of trade 29 November,2018 to 17 December, 2018: 32%

 

Volume of trade 20 December, 2018: 399T

Short selling 20 December, 2018; 341T

Short selling as % of trade on 20December, 2019: 85%

 

This shorting activity may be difficultto understand if one agrees with following:

 

EWC AGM information was received verypositively by those shareholders attending.

EWC ASX announcement re: 20 year SengkangPSC extension and Philippines power plant being certified as an EPNS are extremelysignificant.

SCBPE extension of $50m loan for another3 years and option to purchase 101m shares at 50c/share are a vote ofconfidence in EWC management.

US$12m signing bonus and US$8.8m bankguarantee re: 20 year Sengkang PSC has been paid to SKKMigas.

Summary: relevant banks ($50m 3 yearloan and US$8.8m bank guarantee) have, after due diligence having been carriedout, voted with their money and EWC Philippines and Indonesian projects havemade significant progress (20year Sengkang PSC extension and obtaining EPNScertification for the Pagbilao power plant)

 

On the basis of this kind ofinformation/assessment, plus taking ‘The Docs’ 18 Dec 2018 comment (see postabove) into account,  it appears to me that ‘normal shorting activity’ (ie. selling shares today in oder to purchase these shares at a lower price in the future) does not make any financial sense at all. Consequently, one explanation for the continued shorting in EWC may be that, prior to the US$75m loan provided by the DBP,  ‘competitive interest’  undertake all efforts in order to put as many obstacles in EWC’s way as possible.