Snippets from...

Snippets from
https://www.minister.communications...ides-5g-security-guidance-australian-carriers

Which contains the sentence.

The Government considers that the involvement of vendors who are likely to be subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign government that conflict with Australian law, may risk failure by the carrier to adequately protect a 5G network from unauthorised access or interference.


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5G requires a network architecture that is significantly different to previous mobile generations.

Traditionally, network equipment used by telecommunications operators has been categorised into the ‘core’ network and the ‘edge’ network.

The core network is where the more sensitive functions occur including access control, authentication, voice and data routing, and billing.

The edge consists of the radios and other equipment used to connect customer equipment (such as handsets, laptops and tablets) to the core network.

Where previous mobile networks featured clear functional divisions between the core and the edge, 5G is designed so that sensitive functions currently performed in the physically and logically separated core will gradually move closer to the edge of the network.

In that way, the distinction between the core and the edge will disappear over time.

This shift introduces new challenges for carriers trying to maintain their customers’ security, as sensitive functions move outside of the highly protected core environment.

This new architecture provides a way to circumvent traditional security controls by exploiting equipment in the edge of the network – exploitation which may affect overall network integrity and availability, as well as the confidentiality of customer data. A long history of cyber incidents shows cyber actors target Australia and Australians.

Government has found no combination of technical security controls that sufficiently mitigate the risks.

While we are protected as far as possible by current security controls, the new network, with its increased complexity, would render these current protections ineffective in 5G.

Therefore, Government has expectations of the application of the TSSR obligations with respect to the involvement of third party vendors in 5G networks, including evolution of networks leading to mature 5G networks.

The Government considers that the involvement of vendors who are likely to be subject to extrajudicial directions from a foreign government that conflict with Australian law, may risk failure by the carrier to adequately protect a 5G network from unauthorised access or interference.