No Bloody Way, Id be happy to join a class action and sue the...

No Bloody Way, Id be happy to join a class action and sue the %^$# though,.
SMH:http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-fumbles-that-led-to-forge-groups-demise-20140214-32rel.html

For David Simpson, it was pretty much the dream job: his first gig as chief executive of his own public company.
After an extensive background in the construction sector, working for ABB and Leighton, he had most recently run UGL's resources arm, a $1 billion business. So stepping up to run his own show was the opportunity of a lifetime.
As a former rugby player, the one-time front-row prop didn't often get the ball, let alone the chance to score a try. But with the job as chief executive of Forge Group, he had the ball firmly in hand and the finishing line in sight. ''But then, out of nowhere, I was tripped.''
David Simpson.
David Simpson. Photo: AFR
In his case, it was two power-station projects: one in Western Australia, the other for AGL and gas-pipeline owner APA Holdings in western Queensland - the Diamantina project.
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Deepening issues with both projects saw the group haemorrhage cash, which saw it collapse into the arms of receiver Ferrier Hodgson this week.
That was after a failed attempt to find a fresh source of equity, which prompted the ANZ Bank to withdraw support.
Since late 2013, once problems emerged at the two projects, KordaMentha and 333 Consulting had been advising Forge on a debt work-out and possible restructuring. But amid intractable problems with the two projects, Forge issued a series of profit warnings, which indicated it had little clarity over the problems. In late January, the board decided to seek a buyer for all, or parts, of the business.
Claiming it had been approached several times, after less than a fortnight of negotiations the sole remaining prospective buyer was a private equity group that wanted ANZ to commit to additional funds.
In the final few days, while ANZ was considering pumping in another $14 million, surety providers - believed to be QBE Insurance and some local units of Swiss Re - baulked, and in a joint vote with ANZ decided enough was enough.
As a result, on Tuesday Forge declared it couldn't go on, conceding that its financial backers had withdrawn support. Receivers were appointed later that day.
Initial estimates put its debts at $500 million, with more than 1400 employees thrown out of work. The foreign assets - primarily an asset-management outfit in the US and smaller operations in Asia and Africa - are expected to realise a gain, but even so, a shortfall is anticipated.
The ANZ exposure is believed to be a headline amount of $200 million. Although its final loss will be significantly less than that, no one is willing to commit to firm figures so early in the process.
There are few winners - particularly one-time cornerstone investor Clough - with shareholders appearing to have lost all their money, and the reputation of senior management having been trashed as the company sank from an ASX 200 index component to feather duster. And it has left a trail of destruction in the resources sector, including Gina Rinehart's long-awaited Roy Hill iron-ore project.
Building and engineering outfits regularly have contracts that can cause problems, and Forge is the first collapse of a public company since the resources boom cooled.
A spin-off from aiLimited, Forge listed in 2001 and worked its way through various mergers, most notably when WA oil and gas contractor Clough emerged with a one-third holding in mid-2012. Most of its stake was acquired at $2.10 through a partial takeover.
It sold out at $6.05 in March last year, and soon after Forge shares were included in the ASX 200.
By late last year, Forge was confident enough of its prospects to declare it would play a key role in any rationalisation of the domestic engineering sector. At that time, with a sharemarket value of more than $500 million - exceeding that of Transfield Services, for example - it was positive about its future.
But the game unravelled with the poor execution of work on power-station projects inherited with the purchase of specialist construction operator CTEC at the start of 2013, before Simpson took up his position. Costing an initial $10 million, but with a possible payout of up to $38.6 million, the final cost was about $36 million. CTEC promised annual revenue up to $250 million and a gross profit, as measured by earnings before interest, depreciation, tax and amortisation, of up to $20 million.
With Simpson settled in behind the wheel, Forge was pushing to transform itself into a tier 1 player in its space, diversifying earnings into the eastern states while building a US presence.
A matter of months later, those ambitions have come to nought and the company is now worthless.


Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/business/the-fumbles-that-led-to-forge-groups-demise-20140214-32rel.html#ixzz2tLCQ9Rz8