Feedback for Management, page-15

Your not getting your message across, perhaps be more succinct in your original post, so fools like me don't just scroll pass,

I know my grammar skill is woeful but I will try to impart my message with an example.
Hopefully, Pear maybe better at explaining it, as it appears that he/she has gotten the gist of what I’m trying to say.

I’ve used this example or analogy in a previous post but I'll try too make clearer.

Lets assume us shareholders are owners in a building with a large number of units, being managed by a Unit complex manager.

Within this building there are two penthouses, in one penthouse lives the 'top 20 companies' and in the other penthouse resides the remainder of the '100 thousands plus shareholders'. The Unit complex manager is this case is BOQ!

We call all the unit owners to have meetings and vote on how and where the sinking fund money should be spent.

We need to assume the body corporate meeting is run under the 'poll voting system'.
Under this voting system the majority of Unit holder go through the motion of voting but are unlikely to ever decide where the sinking fund should be spent. It is decided by the two penthouses!

Is this a fair system to most Australians? I would be confident that most of us would say, No!

The next part is the most difficult to explain and is the reason why the majority of shareholders votes are valueless.

Generally within the 'top 20 companies' the majority of these companies reward their management team under the same voting principle, as when we voted on the resolution dealing with remuneration and allocating shares and options to individual members within BOQ.

It is in these companies interest to hang on this self servicing method and vote for their fellow directors and management team in another company that they hold shares in, through a number of vehicles - that is why I mentioned AMP as it is one of the 'top 20 companies' that an interest in BOQ.

So to me, this method on the rewards resolutions lacks transparency and looks suspicious.

That’s why I made the following comment in the previous post, that the rewarded one's are the ones who ultimately decide whether their fellow compatriots are worthy of the rewards.

The following is my understanding of the Act when it comes to mergers and demergers. On these occasions we are given the rare privilege to partake in voting under the 'one vote per shareholder '

All I’m requesting is to extend this voting system only to any reward resolutions.

The big end town will still retain their privileges in influencing the directions and who is on the board and managing the company.

There seem to be this great fear when I have approached a number of directors from different companies about these changes. The fear extends to displaying even as general information under the one vote per shareholder concept - one vote per entity. An explanation is in another post.

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