There have been some valid points raised since the funding...

There have been some valid points raised since the funding announcement, but if I may add a few points of my own:

1. The funding agreement was less than ideal, but GMC weren't exactly in the driver's seat. They almost certainly were relying on DSO to, if not completely fund construction, at least give them more bargaining power at the negotiating table with potential investors. The permit did not arrive (perhaps the new investor even played a part in delaying it) and GMC were backed into a corner with cash about to run out, the Acuity Capital agreement virtually useless as they'd be lucky to raise $1.5m at current SP levels (125mil @ 1.2c), and insufficient capity under rules 7.1 and 7.1A to tap shareholders for funds.

Selling a % of PT Gulf should come as no surprise, but they have sold 25% of the project very cheaply and it would be very difficult to argue otherwise. In a short-term sense it may devalue the company, but it certainly does not devalue the project itself. Long-term it's somewhat irrelevent as GMC have to divest at least 20% of the project to local investors after 6 years anyway (51% after 10 years). The most important thing is that the project is now fully funded and the new cornerstone investors supposedly have the clout to make things happen.

2. The PT JTS/Eighteen Blue convertible notes are different to the notes issued to BB Lee in that GMC were required to pay back BB Lee within 1 month of his request, whereas should PT JTS/Eighteen Blue decide not to convert, GMC will be charged 15% interest p.a. until full payment has been received. Either way GMC have the funds to complete construction, and the only way they should default on a repayment is if the company goes into administration, in which case does it really matter that the new noteholders would acquire the smelters?

I personally would prefer they not convert and GMC retain 100% of the project, if that were at all possible. The interest on the $8m convertible notes (15%) and $7m funding facility (20%) would be A$2.6m per annum. DSO (should the permit ever arrive) would reportedly cover the annual interest costs in 2 months or less. 25% profit of 2 operating smelters was last forecast to be US$5.5m per annum. It's difficult to imagine them not converting.

BB Lee will also be repaid his $1m out of PT JTS's $6m. In my opinion, the BB Lee convertible notes served no purpose other than for Triple C to technically achieve a fully-subscribed $12m placement and receive full payment of 80mil GMC options. Without the BB Lee notes, Triple C would have instead received 40mil options. With BB Lee deciding not to convert to shares, there was little doubt GMC would not risk spending any of the $1m sitting in the call deposit, because they would be unable to repay it on demand.

3. Tanah Capital choosing not to subscribe to the placement says little about their belief in GMC. They kept GMC solvent during administration and were given ~8% of the company for effectively $875k @ 0.5c as a thank you. Without Tanah's commitment of a further $3m towards the CR, there is every chance it would have failed. The necessary confidence was inspired, and Tanah appear to have used a loophole relating to the existing off-take agreement to back out of the commitment, despite all the pubically announced requirements having been met.

But Tanah still appears hold all of their shares, despite 4 months ago sitting on 400% profit at a time when there was more than enough volume to completely exit. Even now they're holding firm on 200% profit. To me, that says a lot more about their belief in GMC. There's also little doubt in my mind that Tanah was the major shareholder referenced in the FY17 Annual Report who "signed a letter of comfort to provide financial support to the Company for the next 12 months."

4. GMC have themselves stated that power costs are one of the project's main weaknesses. By the company's own costings, power supply accounts for 64% of processing costs and nearly 45% of total operationing costs. Despite this admitted weakness, the project was still forecast in April 2017 to have an operating margin of 46% with 2 operating smelters, or almost US$700/tonne. Since then, ferro manganese prices have increased and GMC appear to be in negotiations to reduce their power costs.