CML 0.00% 2.0¢ chase mining corporation limited

King's ransom in Coles partsPaul Kerin Paul Kerin teaches...

  1. 404 Posts.
    lightbulb Created with Sketch. 15
    King's ransom in Coles parts


    Paul Kerin Paul Kerin teaches strategy at Melbourne Business School.

    The Australian Financial Review | 21 Aug 2006

    *****************************************
    The retailer should chart its own course, writes Paul Kerin. Investors and commentators have failed to pick the real reasons behind two critical recent events. First,
    why did Coles Myer's share price really plummet after CEO John Fletcher's announcement on July 31 of
    his new strategy? Second, why have potential bidders for Coles really emerged now? The real answers
    to these questions give Coles's long-suffering shareholders reason to smile.

    Within three days of Fletcher's strategy announcement, Coles shares plummeted 9.4 per cent, wiping out
    more than $1.1 billion of shareholder value. The drop was generally blamed on the poor strategy that
    Fletcher announced. And it was appalling. Fletcher said it took nine months to construct but, frankly, it
    could have been written on the back of a napkin over lunch.
    He defended his new strategy by saying, "We know our vision is seen by some as being too bold". Too
    bold? What planet is he on? The problem was that it contained nothing bold at all! But the strategy's
    nothingness did not spook the market - after all, it had learned not to expect much. Rather, sensible
    investors were spooked when they realised this strategy, if implemented, would cut off extremely
    valuable strategic options.
    Sensible investors have long realised that a full Coles break-up would create substantial value - although
    this seems to have escaped its board and management. Some hoped that the successful sale of Myer
    may have made Coles reconsider the merit of a break-up.
    Several years ago, I criticised Coles Myer's decision to re-brand Grace Bros stores to Myer (Coles takes
    wrong step, AFR, February 2, 2004). The reaction of Dawn Robertson (then Myer's managing director)
    would have put Hezbollah to shame. But my point was that divestment of Myer was clearly the best
    option and that re-branding was costly - in direct outlays (at least $10 million to $20 million), but more
    importantly in dumping a brand that would have been very valuable to potential acquirers of Myer.
    Dumping the Grace Bros brand made a valuable option more difficult to realise.
    Potential acquirers have emerged now because the re-branding and integration elements of Fletcher's
    "new" strategy will cut off valuable options. They are trying to rescue very valuable businesses and
    Page 1 of 2
    King's ransom in Coles parts
    Paul Kerin Paul Kerin teaches strategy at Melbourne Business School. Earlier this year, he
    advised
    brands from the value destruction that would happen under the new strategy. If acquirers do not have a
    well-known brand to build on - and, even worse, have to spend money re-branding an acquired business
    - they have less reason to do the deal. They realise they must act now before the new strategy gets too
    far down the track.
    Coles's closing share price of $13.45 last Friday put its market capitalisation at just over $16 billion - up
    $2.8 billion (21.2 per cent) for the week. Analysts bids at present generally range between $13 and $15;
    Citigroup estimates that a private-equity bid could not exceed $15.70 ($18.7 billion). I firmly believe
    that this understates the potential for value creation.
    The last time Coles semi-seriously considered a break-up was in mid-2002, when Swiss investment bank
    UBS conducted Project Gold. Shareholders missed out on substantial gains then; they should hope
    Coles does a better job now.
    UBS's work contained at least two glaring furphies. First, the claim that Myer could not be sold - or be
    viable - on its own. What hogwash!
    Second, UBS argued that shareholder tax implications put the kybosh on a full break-up. This implies a
    false assumption: that without a break-up, shareholders will never sell! Yet the average holding period
    for Australian shares is about one year; therefore, on average, existing shareholders will sell them within
    six months. Though a break-up does have a tax cost, it is far smaller than break-up opponents have
    claimed
    Interestingly, UBS has now switched sides, supporting the Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts-led consortium.
    Substantial value gains are available, but the extent to which existing shareholders capture them
    depends on how Coles plays its hand. It should set up an open auction, inviting bids for any Coles
    business or combination of businesses. This will flush out the best bids from trade buyers interested in
    parts but not the whole. Rather than repeat the mistake of pre-judging what value-maximising business
    combinations to offer, let the market decide.
    © TM ® | AFR Access material is copyright & is published by Fairfax or under licence. Except for the temporary computer cache copy & a single
    permanent copy for personal reference, it may not be used, copied, reproduced, published, distributed, sold or resold, stored in a retrieval system, altered
    or transmitted in any form or by any means in whole or part or otherwise disseminated to others (except by fair dealing) without the prior written approval of
    Fairfax or the relevant licensor. AFR, AFR Access, the AFR logo & the newspaper mastheads are trademarks or registered trademarks of Fairfax & its
    related bodies corporate. Other trademarks & logos of a third party may be displayed from time to time, but no display grants any licence or right of use of
    any such trademark or logo without the express written permission of the relevant owner.
    Page 2 of 2
 
watchlist Created with Sketch. Add CML (ASX) to my watchlist

Currently unlisted public company.

arrow-down-2 Created with Sketch. arrow-down-2 Created with Sketch.