No, this is actually not what I am saying. Let me try to explain.
Let's say a company has a plan to take over GXY. For the sake of the argument, let's called this company XhiLin.
XhiLin instructs (and pays) several brokers (for the sake of the argument, lets call one of them MS) to short the hell out of GXY and keep the SP dub $2 for as long as it takes them to finalise the acquisition.
XhiLin has a lot of money and it doesn't really matter how much it cost. It's pretty much irrelevant.
In parallel, XhiLin sets up 15 companies and capitalise each of them with enough money to be able to purchase 4.9% of galaxy at $2 a share.
For the sake of the arguments, let's call them CMP1, CMP2, ... CMP15 or CMPs for all of them together.
As MS is reaching the target of $2, the 15 companies starts accumulating shares, in a round-robin way. This is done by MS. Lots of X-trades and lots of "after market" trades.
Once CMPs have altogether an (aggregated) amount of share that is sufficient to have a majority vote (+ whatever % was shorted) , XhiLin comes in and make its offer.
The directors have a duty to pass the offer to the shareholders with their recommendation. Whether it is to "accept" or "refuse", the CMPs vote yes. XhiLin now owns the company. They instruct MS to return the shares to their rightful owners, the shares are covered by MS by buying them from the CMPs at whatever price they are. It doesn't matter whether the shorting was profitable or not. XhiLin took control of Galaxy for a bargain.
Tutor says the directors can reject the offer without passing it tot he shareholders, I don't believe it is true (I might be wrong, it could be in the constitution) but even if it is the case, the CMPs now have enough power to overthrow the ones that don't play the ball,.
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