Ann: Ceasing to be a substantial holder, page-94

Some extracts from an article worth reading (and relevant to the conversation above) though I somewhat disagree with the article's premise / conclusion.... i.e. being ABC there is a strong left/anti-capitalist bias (taxpayer funding be damned)

http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-29/no-fee-lawyers-group-action-shine-slater-gordon/9913858

Opinion: Why giving lawyers a profit motive won't help the system's neediest

There is significant national momentum to lift the ban on lawyers charging contingency fees in this country, with two significant law reform commissions supporting the use of such fees to address perceived access to justice issues in Australia.
This would be a significant change to the traditional time-based billing practices for lawyers.


But when closely considered, the case for the introduction of contingency fees — which are calculated as a percentage of what's recovered for the client — in Australia is, in fact, weak.
Currently, the closest analogue to contingency fees is an "uplift fee" of a regulated percentage of standard rates, such as that commonly used in the "no-win no-fee" deals offered by class action plaintiff firms.

The attraction of contingency fees is that the lawyer's fee is potentially much greater than standard hourly rates.
So the question that arises is, why would lawyers permitted to charge contingency fees suddenly be attracted to the low-value, high-risk claims where access to justice issues are unquestionably most engrained?

[ ... ]

This isn't mere speculation — it is presently perfectly legal for third-party litigation funders to charge contingency fees, and they rarely support low-value claim on behalf of disadvantaged Australia (outside some notable pro bono exceptions). Rather they generally pursue high-value shareholder class actions against corporate Australia.
Why would contingency fees cause lawyers to behave any differently?