Feedback for Management, page-8

Following comments are based on figures from the 2017 annual report

No. of ordinary % shares held by the top 20. Total 195,713,428 49.96%

If you included  the 55 shareholders who hold over 100 thousands shares the % increases dramatically.

So basically 75 shareholders dictate to  94,752 other shareholders.

If we assume that only that only 5% of 95 thousands bother to vote, it equate to 75 against 4738 shareholders.
Assuming that the 4738 each held 10,000 shares (approx 85 thousands hold less then 5000 shares), it still only amounts to about 47.4 million against 195.7 million.

So these figures proves that it is virtually impossible to achieve the 25% strike rule, unless at least one or more of the top 20 gets involved. That’s is why I commented in a previous post that it was enacted with the intent to give false hope to shareholders.

Further Joewolf, you are making assumptions that the other shareholders haven’t the assessment skill when it comes to remunerating  management.   
Like I mentioned before, it will give a balanced view on how well the management team performance was perceived by the majority of shareholders.

To me, it sounds like you are trying to protect 'best practices' for their hip pockets.

AMP being one of the top 20 companies holding shares in BOQ, reward their management team also through the poll voting system which is preferred by the Institution of Directors.

One could conclude, that the rewarded one's, decide how much there namesakes should be rewarded.

I’m starting to suspect that you are in such a position, with you ardent defence of a small part in running a company.

My comments about shareholders refusal to participating in voting, is purely based on empirical evidence.
Asking why, they don’t bother to vote and their response is that the big end of town determine the outcome.

Radicool Views